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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action brought for the replevin of Seven
Bermuda Units. The Defendants contend -th2.t the slid
S•aven Bermuda Units are motor vehicles and subject to
the provisions of SE·ction 3, Title 41, ·utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended.
DISPOSITION iN-LOWER. COURT.
The Court held that the said seven Bermuda Units
vrere not motor vehicles and grantEd judgment to the
Plaintiff.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

The Plaintiff seeks to have the Court affirm the judgment of the District Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
There were numerous tearings in the District. Court
of Grand County,_ State of U~~h,. -between the .. l~th ·day of
June, 1963, and the lOth day of February, 1964. The Defendants called Mr.. Ross D .. Frands·E·n of the Utah State
Tax Commission ss a witness. All other facts were stipulated and undispubzd. In addition to· the facts stated in
Appellant's: .Brief, the R:E·sponderit adds the following:
The said Bermuda Units were each constructed in such
a mann•er that axles and w·heels could h2· placed under tl)em·
for the purpose of moving them upon the public h.~ghways,
however, the said Bermuda Units were never . equip~ed
with axles and wheels; excep.t when actually being trans-·
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3
ported, and no such ·t:·quipment was ever sold by 1\ilr. George
Dannenhc.um to the D-efendants.
Further, each Bermuda Unit consists of two separate
apartments with separate 'e·ntrances. Each apartment has
a kitchan, bedroom, and bath.
All seven of the said Agreements were assignEd by
Mr. Dannenbaum to the Plaintiff. The Def'Cndant made·
regular monthly payments on the Agreement~ unti~ August
1962, then they bE·cam-c delinquent and this suit w·as
brought to recover the said seven Bermuda Units.

ARGUMENT

POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY HELD THAT
THE SEVEN BERMUDA UNITS WERE NOT INTENDED PRIMARILY FOR OPERATION ON THE PUBLIC
HIGHVvAYS AND THEREFORE NOT MOTOR VEHICLES AS DEFINED BY SECTION 3, TITLE 41, UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDED.
41-6-2 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, defin2-s various types of hevicles as follows:
"(a) ''Vehicle." Every device in, upon, or by which any
p·arson or property is or may be transported or drawn
upon a highway, except devices movEd by human

power or used exclusively upon stationary rails
tracks.

or

''(b) "Motor Vehicle." Every vehicl-a which is s£1fpropelled and every vehicle which is propelled by electric power obtained from overhead trolley wires,
but not operated upon rails.''
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· 41-6-4 Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, defines v2.rious typE·s of trailers as follows:

" . . . . (c) "Trailer." Every

vehick~

with or 'vithout

motive powe!, other than a pole trailer, designed for
carrying persons or propc:-rty and for being drawn by
a motor v·2hicle and so constructed th2 t no part of its
. ~eight rests upon the towing vehicle ....
"(d) ''Semi-Trailer." Every vehicl.t:· with or without
. motive· power, other than a pole trail·zr, designed for
carrying. persons or property and for being drawn by
a rnotor vehicle and so constructed that some part of
its weight and that of its load rests upon or is carri•2d
by another vehicle ...
· ''{f) ''IIous2· Trailer.H A trailer or semi-trailer in excess of 1500 pounds gross weight whic~ is d·~signed,
constructed, and equipped 2s a dwelling place, living
abode, or slee:,Jing place, r-ither ~·armanently or temporarily and is equipped for use as a conveyance on
streets and highways, or ....

"(g) ''Trailer or Semi-Trailer.'' A trailer or semitrailer whose chassis and exterior shell is design:c:d
and constructed for us•z as a. House Trailer, as defined
in p2ragraph (f), but which is used inst£-ad permanently or temporarily for the advertising, sales, display,
or promotion of· merchandise or service, or for any
oth•ar commercial purposes rxcept the tr.1nsportation
of property for hire or the transportation of property
for ·distribution by a private carrier."
The Motor Vebicle Act has definE-d Motor Vehicle,
Trail·ar, Semi-Trailer, House Trailer, separ.1tely. It specifically states that a Motor VE·hicle is one that is self propelled, and the U t.ah Court has so held.
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In Pacific Intermountain Express Co. v. State Ta..x
Commission, 8 U. 2d 144; 329 P. 2d 650, the Court states
as follows:
-'' .... Under the Motor Vehicle· Act we find the .term
Motor Ve:1icle, Trailer, and Semi-Trailer, significantly d•ascribed separs tely. It states that a Motor V-£·hicle
is one that is self-propelled. A Trailer is one without
motive po"\ver .... drawn by a ,Motor Y.t:·hicle, and a
Semi-Trailer is describ.zd as a vehicle without active
power . . . . drE.. wn by a motor vebicle. The last two
definitions do not lend themselves to ·any compelling
conclusion that such pieces of equipment are· selfpropelled as in. the case with the definition of l\Iotor
Vevicle. On the othE·r hand, the Motor V~hicle Act,
by tl"aatjpg _then1_s~parately, would indicate an intent
not to include trzilers and semi-trailers in ·the term
·Motor Ve·hicle. Such conclusion is further substantiated
_in the section t~at requiras motor vehicles, trailers,
and semi-trailers to be_ registered s·E·parately (Title
41-1-19, U. C. A. 1953). If ·t,he cont.zntion of the tax
.commission that a truck 2nd a trailer together are a
1\iotor ·v2hicle, it would follow that tbe two pieces of
equipment would be sub}act to but one· registration.
This cannot: be done ·under·the registration statute.
" ...£\side from the· stltutes themselves, very respectable
authority (Hayes Freigbt Lines. v ..Cheatham, Okl.
1954, 27'7 P. ?d 664, 48 A. L. R. 2d 1278; Prudential
Ins. Co. of Great Britain v. Associated Emp. Lloyds,
supra; Vest v. Kramer, Ohio App. 1951, 111 N. E. 2d
696, where the st.atuts· is very similar to Utah's Gen~
dre·zu v. State Farm Fire Ins. Co., of Bloomington, IlL,
1939, 206 Minn. 237, 288 N~· W. 225, contra.) treats
a motor vehicle and & pieee of tandem equipm·Ent as
being mutually exclusive at least if they are not [ r·tually operational by attacbm·E·nt, and as a unit, - ~~
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problern not presented here. 'The attitudes of courts
that hg,ve had th·a question befor2· them, succinctly are
summarized in 60 C. J. S. Motor Ve:r1icles: 1, p. 110,
where it is said:
''A trailer or semitrailer is a vehicle:·, but is not a motor
vehicle except that insofar as it ficilitates the primary
function of a motor vehicle of transporting persons
and things, after being attacbed to the motor vehicle
for that purpose, it m:1y be r•agarded as becoming a
party of the. motor . vehicle, although as to the latter
pro:position t!lere is also authority to the contrary.
"A N·ew York Case (Henn·assy v. Walker, 1938, 279
N.Y. 94, 17 N. E. 2d 782, 784, 119 A. L. R. 1029) holding thE t trJ.ilers and semi-trailers were not motor vehicles, pointed out that:

"Trailers and semi~tr2.i}3rs are vehicles within the
· mea·ning of t~1e Vehicl,e and Traffic Law, ***but
they are not Motor Vehicles. The Legislature having defined and classifiot:d a tr1iler and semi-trailer
as Pc:Qarate and distinct vehicles, ***itl is presumed
that it would have referred to thE·m by name had
it intended to include them within the provisions
of Section 59.

''W,a approve that the above·· statement and consider
it particularly applicable to our statutes and t'h€· definitions therein cont:1ined • . . ."
The seven Bermuda Units certainly cannot qualify ·as
n1otor vehic:•zs. under the-· general provisions of Title 41,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, r s a1nended. The question
then is w:1ethe:r or not the said B·E·rmud~ Units are "Motor
v~hicles" as·: the term is defined by the provisions of 413-7 TJtah Code Annotated, 1953, as am·e·nded which states:
''41-3-7. Definitions - l\!Iotor ve:1ic.Ie des lers' adnlinistrator, - Appointn1ent - Supervision by state t.1x
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7
commission. - The following 'vords a·nd phrases, when
usrd in this act, shall for the pur_nose of this act, ihave
the meaning respectively ascribed zs follows, to wit:
' (a) Motor Vehicle. Every v•zhicle intended primarily for uss· and operation on the public highways
,vhich is self-propelled; and every vehicle intended
PRilVIARILY for operation on the public hig':1,vays
which is not driven or :propelled by its O\Vn power, but
which is d·asign& ted either to be attacihed to and become a part of, or to be drawn by a self-propellEd
vehicle; but not including farm tractors and other
machines and tools used in the production, iharvesting, and cEre of farm products ... ''

In Charvos v. Bonn·zville .Irrig. Dist., 120 U. 480, 235
P. 2d 780, in interpr.Eting the word "Primary" the Court
states:
''The argument that t'he words . 'Primary Cause,'
should be interpreted as n1•aaning 'sole .cause,' can have
no merit since the word 'Primary' cannotes the existance· of plurality, while t~~'le word 'sole' cannotE·s the
singular." ·
In construing the language of the s'tc.tute with the
above cited case, one must CE·rtainly r•zach the conclusion
tbat the legislature recognized that there wer·a soni~. items
of p~rsonll property. that me y be ·.drawn upon a public
highway frcm time to timE· by a motor v·zhicle that would
not fall within the J:rovisions oi the statute.
In· further analyzing the statute, and specific2.lly thl!
phrase ''Intended Primlrily for Operation on thE· Public
Hignway2.,'' it is clear that one must look to the use and
operE.tion of ·any. vehicle in order to establish its primary
purpose:·. Pacific Northw'Cst Alloys v. State,. 306, P 2d 197,
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1957, Washington Case, the· Court in discussing the words
''Primary Purpose,'' states:
''What do t~1e words ''Primary Purpose" mean. A cardinal rule of statutary construction is that the words
to be constru•3d must be given th~c:·ir usual and ordinary
meaning. State v. Houck, 1949, 32 Wash. 2d 681, 685,
203 P 2d 693; Sandona v. City of Cle Elum, 1951, 37
Wash. 2d 831, 837, 226, P. 2d 889. In Black's Law Dictionary · (4th Ed.) , "Primary" is ·designed as first,
principal, chief, leading. '~Primary Purpose" is defined
as "That which is first in intention, which is fundam·e·ntal."
See also People of the State of California ex rei. Ernest D. Breuning, County Surveyor of the County of Shasta,
State of California v. Raymond H. BE>rry and Scott Lumber
Company, a corporation, 304 P. 2d 818.
In consideraing use as an element in determining. the
primary' :IJ'ufpose of the said Bermuda· Units in question,
one·
har~~y. cons~der them to b·3 vehicles. From son1etime prior to October of 1961 for the five Units and prior
to December 1961 for tbe other t\vo Units, thesra Units hav~
bee·n dn the public highway but .two times, ~nd in each of
those· ca·ses 1t took special equipment ·to move them.

ca:n

In. addition to needing spe.ci3l equipment to move· these
Unit.s, they also have· the .distinction ·of b·aing able to house
two separate families in the t\vo separate ap.1rtments in
each Unit, which apzrtments can be rented at different
times and for different periods of time.

The present case is Vtary similar to the Motel Case spoken ~f by Mr. Ross D. FrandsE·n from the Ut3!h Stste Tax
Commission, who testified

~s

follows:
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"Well, now let me €xplain that. The specific. unit that
I was talking about or that we were talking about was
a motel that was he-ing constructed in Cedar City,
Utah. No\v this rnotel vvas built out of state and brought
into this state "\Vith three units of the motel together.
They were broug,bt in on thr~E·e sets of axles and set up
as a motel in Cedar City. It's the only one that I know
of. Now that was purchas•cd out of state and was
brought in along t~e highway. That is the only one
that I knovv of. That is the sp2·cific one." (Page 6 of Tr.)
It is logical to assume from Mr. Frandsen's testimony that
The Utlh St2-te Tax Commission does not take the rigid
position the defendants advocate. That it is nE·cessary to
consider the use for which the Units shall be put to before
they can be classEd as "1\lotor Vehicles.''
POINT II.
THE ASSIG~lMENT OF THE SEVEN CONDITIONAL SALES AGREEMENTS BY GEORGE DANNENBAUM, A RESIDENT OF THE STATE OF NE'V MEXICO, TO THE PL.t'.LINTIFF, AND THE COLLECTIONS
MADE PURSUANT TO SAID AGREEMENTS BY THE
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ''DOING BUSINESS" IN THE STArrE
OF UTAH, WITHIN THE MEANI~TG OF THE STATUTE.
16-10-102 Utah Code .A.nnots.ted 1953, as amended,

states in part:

'' .... ¥/ithout excluding obber activities which may
constitute trensacting business in this State, foreign
corporations shall net b·a considered to be transacting
businE·ss in this state, for the purpose of this act, by
reason of carrying on in this state any one or n1ore
of tbe following activities:
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''. . . . (g) Creating evidence· of debt, mortgages or
liens on r2al or personal property.
'' .... (k) Acquiring, in transactings (transactions)
outside Utah or in interstate commerce, of conditional sale contracts or of &abts secured by mortgages or liens on real or pE··rsonal property i'n Utah,
collecting or adjusting or (of) principal and interest.
payments thereon, enforcing or adjusting any rights
and (in) prop~rty provided for in said conditional
sale contracts or sE·curing sE id debts, taking any
actions necessary to preserve and protect the interest of the conditional v·andor in the propE·rty covered by said conditional sale contracts or t~e interest
of the mortgagee or holder of ths· lien in said s~curity, or any combination of such transactions ..."
See G·aneral Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Lund, 60 U. 247,
208 P. 502; East Co3st Discount Corp. v. Reynolds, 7 U.
2d 362, 325 p. 2d 853.
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CONCLUSION

To allow thtS DefE-ndants to prevail in the present cause
would be a great miscarriage of justice, and would be· contrary to the express intent of the legislatur~·. It is very
app2.rent when considering the language used by the said
legislature, that there are some items of personal property
that may from time to time be attached to a motor v·~hicle
and drawn upon the public highway, that do not fall within the provisions of the statute.
That the seven B·2·rmuda Units are not intended primarily for operation on the public highv1ay and therefore
not motor vebicles under the law.
That the Plaintiff Corporation is not doing busin£·ss
in the State of Utah, "\vithin the meaning of the statute.
'Fnat judgment should be affirmed and Plainiff should
recover its costs.
Resps·ctfully submitted,
HARRY E. SNOW
Attorney for Thorp Finance Corporation
Plaintiff-Respondent.
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